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The Anthropocentric Advantage?
Environmental Ethics and Climate Change Policy

Nicole Hassouni
Abstract:
Environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. For, many liberals embrace
anthropocentric theories on which only humans have non-instrumental value.
Environmental ethicists argue that such liberals fail to account for many things that
matter or provide an ethic sufficient for addressing climate change. These critics suggest
that many parts of nature -- non-human individuals, other species, ecosystems and the
biosphere have a kind of value beyond what they contribute to human freedom (or other
things of value). This article suggests, however, that if environmental ethics are inclusive
and also entail that concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for
others, they have a different problem. For, when there are many things of value, figuring
out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause
problems for many parts of nature it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive
environmental ethicists need a theory taking all of the things they care about into account
to provide definitive reason even to address climate change. Without this theory,
anthropocentric liberals might argue that we should not accept an inclusive
environmental ethic. Although there may be something wrong with this line of thought, it
at least raises a puzzle for those inclined to accept these ethics.
Key Words:
Climate Change, Liberalism, Environmental Ethics, Anthrpocentrism, Nature, Value,
Pluralism
1. Introduction
Liberalism is defined by a commitment to some kind of human freedom. There
are many ways of understanding this commitment. Some theories start from a concern for
each individual's positive freedoms or capabilities (Nussbaum 2007, 23-24). On others,
negative freedoms (e.g. from arbitrary interference) are of primary importance (Lomasky
1987, ch. 5; Machan 2001; Nozick 1974). Most liberal theories balance a concern for
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different kinds of freedom against other things of value (Rawls 1971; Raz 1998). On
most ways of understanding the commitment to human freedom at the heart of liberalism,
however, it provides definitive reason to mitigate climate change. For, anthropogenic
climate change threatens to undermine individuals’ basic capabilities and interfere with
their negative freedoms. It threatens some individuals’ ability even to survive (Hassoun
2009a; Jamieson 2005).
Nevertheless, environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. At least they
criticize anthropocentric versions of liberalism on which only humans have noninstrumental value.ii Environmental ethicists argue that such ethics fail to account for
many things that matter and are not sufficient for addressing climate change.iii These
critics suggest that many parts of nature -- non-human individuals, other species,
ecosystems and the biosphere -- have a kind of value beyond what they contribute to
human freedom (or other things of value).iv At least inclusive environmental ethicists,
who believe concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others,
can object in this way to the anthropocentric liberals’ arguments. There is probably
something to inclusive environmental ethics as well as the above critique of
anthropocentric liberalism.
Nevertheless, this article suggests that, when it comes to providing definitive
reason to accept climate change policies, the problem might be on the side of inclusive
environmental ethics. For, when there are many things of value, figuring out what to do
can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause problems for
many parts of nature it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive
environmental ethicists need a theory taking all of the things they care about into account
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to provide definitive reason even to address climate change. Without this theory,
anthropocentric liberals might argue that we should not accept an inclusive
environmental ethic.
Next, this article provides a tentative response to this last strand of argument.
Although inclusive environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to accept their
preferred climate change policies, their theories might be developed further in order to
provide this justification. Some such ethics even be developed enough right now that they
will allow us to make all of the necessary choices on the ground when we need to make
them. Moreover, this article argues, there is reason to be optimistic about the prospects
for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change.
Finally, the article suggests that whether or not everyone would accept its
argument, it may be of interest even to those who reject inclusive environmental ethics.
For many theories endorse more than one kind of value and lack principles for resolving
all of the conflicts that may arise between these values. Indeed some anthropocentric
liberal theories are also like this. So this article’s lessons may be important even for some
liberals.
Section 2 considers an argument anthropocentric liberals might give against
inclusive environmental ethics. They might argue that we should reject inclusive
environmental ethics because they are radically incomplete and cannot provide definitive
reason even to address climate change. Section 3 considers a possible response to this
argument. For, even if inclusive environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to
accept their preferred climate change policies, they might develop their theories further to
provide this justification. Some such ethics even be developed enough right now that they
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will allow us to make all of the necessary choices on the ground when we need to make
them. Moreover, this section argues, there is reason to be optimistic about the prospects
for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change. Finally, it suggests
that its lessons may be important even for those who reject such ethics.
2. An Argument Against Inclusive Environmental Ethics
On inclusive environmental ethics, animals, plants, species, ecosystems and/or the
biosphere have a kind of non-instrumental value.v Their value is not, for example,
reducible to their value for human freedom or interests. Even if humans would benefit
from clearing the wetlands for condominiums, for instance, inclusive environmental
ethicists would object that that is not a definitive reason to let them.
Granting that non-human individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth have noninstrumental value does not settle any questions about what to do if there are other things
of value at stake. If, for instance, protecting wetlands conflicts with humans’ interests in
being free from malaria, it is not clear that we should preserve wetlands unaltered
(Willott 2004).
Some environmental ethicists go further, however, to argue that concern for some
parts of nature does not always trump concern for others. Those who think non-human
parts of nature have non-instrumental value, for instance, often argue that human
freedoms (or interests) will not always trump concern for other things that matter.vi When
there is conflict between minor human freedoms or interests and things of significant
environmental value, it will be acceptable to do what is best for non-human parts of
nature. One might argue, similarly, that concern for non-human individuals, species,
ecosystems and so forth does not always trump concern for the other non-human parts of
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nature. So, any way of dealing with climate change that only protects some parts of
nature may fail to protect many things that matter.
Some environmental ethicists are not inclusive (Schmidtz 2002c). Some think
only some parts of nature have non-instrumental value or that concern for some parts of
nature always trumps concern for other parts of nature (Singer 1993; Leopold 1949).
Peter Singer, for instance, seems to think that other things only have value insofar as they
are important for the interests of sentient creatures (Singer 1993). Similarly, Aldo
Leopold suggests that we should care for individuals, species, and ecosystems only
insofar as doing so promotes the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biosphere (Leopold
1949; Callicott 1988; Attfield 1999).
This article provides no objection to these ethics. For, many of these (less
inclusive) environmental ethics can provide definitive reason to address climate change,
at least in principle (Gardiner 2009a).vii On Singer’s theory, for instance, we might just
need to choose the climate change policy that maximizes utility for all sentient
creatures.viii
This article only considers what someone who accepts the following propositions
can say about climate change: 1) Many parts of nature -- individuals, species, ecosystems
and so forth -- have some non-instrumental value and 2) concern for some of these things
does not always trump concern for others. It argues that, because such inclusive
environmental ethics are radically incomplete, they do not provide definitive reason even
to address climate change right now.
This inquiry is important, in part, because many environmental ethicists are at
least inclined towards inclusive ethics. Few are explicit about whether or not they are
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committed to the view. But, many environmental ethicists have at least some sympathy
for components of the view (Hassoun 2009b; Jamieson 1997; Gardiner 2004; Carafo
2002).ix Furthermore, it should be surprising if this article can show that inclusive
environmental ethics cannot provide definitive reason even to address climate change
right now. For, one might see much of the work in environmental ethics as providing
resources from which inclusive environmental ethicists could draw in creating good
climate change policy. One might even think that an inclusive environmental ethic would
be the most promising basis for justifying environmentally friendly climate change policy
right now. For, these ethics embrace many environmental values.
Inclusive Environmental Ethics and Climate Change Policyx
It might initially seem that inclusive environmental ethicists can just add concern
for all of the things they care about to an anthropocentric liberal theory to arrive at
adequate climate change policy. Where, a climate change policy is just an answer to the
question “What should humans do, if anything, about climate change?”.xi After all,
environmental problems like climate change pose non-negligible risk of serious harm to
many non-human individuals, species, and ecosystems (Gardiner 2004). In fact, there is
mounting evidence that climate change is likely to cause significant problems for the
majority of things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists (IPCC, 2007 2007, 20).
Perhaps these ethicists can tell us that we not only have reason to address climate change
when it threatens to undermine human freedom but when it threatens non-human
individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth (Hassoun 2009b).
Unfortunately, inclusive environmental ethicists cannot just add concern for all of
the things they care about to an anthropocentric liberal theory to arrive at adequate
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climate change policy.xii Although climate change may harm many individuals, species,
ecosystems, and so forth, it may benefit yet other parts of nature in the process. xiii If,
however improbably, anthropogenic climate change brings about the next ice age, arctic
ecosystems and their inhabitants will flourish, though tropical ones and deserts will
disappear.xiv However climate change alters the biosphere it will create problems for
some (at least existingxv) individuals and species, but be good for others (Outwater 1996;
Whyte 2002). Climate change will also have some positive and some negative effects on
(existing) ecosystems and the biosphere (IPCC, 2007 2007, 20). Inclusive environmental
ethics are radically incomplete; although they can provide some reasons in favor of
mitigating climate change, they also provide reasons not to mitigate climate change. They
provide similarly conflicting reasons for and against implementing more specific climate
change policies. Inclusive environmental ethics do not tell us where the weight of reason
lies. So they do not, right now, provide definitive reason even to address climate change.
This argument is probably strongest when applied just to the choice between
different mitigation strategies as opposed to the choice of mitigating vs. letting climate
change proceed unchecked. Without a theory that is worked out in a lot of detail, it will
be hard to tell whether it is best to, for instance, use solar energy or wind power to
mitigate climate change. So, even if inclusive environmental ethicists do not have a
problem justifying their choice of mitigating climate change (vs. not mitigating it), they
might still have a problem in justifying the particular mitigation strategies they prefer.
The problem for inclusive environmental ethicists only gets worse if they care
about more than climate change’s impact on existing parts of nature. Consider beaver and
elephants. Many environmental ethicists argue that beaver are important precisely
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because they flood the plains and create wetlands, though some individuals that prefer
plains suffer in the process (UN 2008). Similarly, some environmental ethicists want to
protect elephants even though they threaten endangered species like rhino and baobab
trees when they tear down forests (Hassoun and Wong forthcoming; Whyte 2002). These
ethicists might maintain that elephants’ destruction is creative - they open the vast
savannah, exerting adaptive pressure on other species, enriching the earth by creating
new ecosystems (Norton 1987). Just as beavers create wetlands out of prairies and
elephants create plains out of forests, climate change will replace some ecosystems with
others. Climate change, like beavers and elephants, may open up new evolutionary
niches, making ecosystems more dynamically and resiliently stable (Norton 2002).
Climate change may even act like early cyanobacteria. These anaerobic
photosynthesizers reproduced so prolifically that they used up most of the carbon dioxide
existing individuals and species needed to survive (Croal 2005). In doing so, however,
they produced a lot of oxygen, making it easier for aerobic organisms to evolve. Climate
change may give life to a whole new world. Consider how one scientist put the point:
To the conservation biologist, there is little positive to be said about
extinction. From an evolutionary perspective, however, extinction is a
double-edged sword. By definition, extinction terminates lineages and thus
removes unique genetic variation and adaptations. But over geological
time scales, it can reshape the evolutionary landscape in more creative
ways, via the differential survivorship of lineages and the evolutionary
opportunities afforded by the demise of dominant groups and the
postextinction sorting of survivors (Jablonski 2001, 5393).
Even extinction has its upside.xvi
Perhaps those who care about many things can reject this last move. Maybe they
can justify taking a much more limited temporal perspective. They might, for instance,
value different parts of nature over different time scales (Norton 2003).
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There are two problems with this suggestion. First, it is not clear that inclusive
environmental ethicists can provide a non-arbitrary way to value different parts of nature
over different time scales. Second, even if they can do so, they may not be able to offer
definitive reason to accept their preferred climate change policies. For, we have seen how
climate change (and, hence, different climate change policies) will affect existing
individuals, species, ecosystems, and so forth differently.xvii
Nothing in the above argument (or the rest of this article) requires a commitment
to consequentialism. As stated, the argument points to the different benefits and harms
climate change will bring to existing individuals, species, and so forth. It can, however,
be recast in different theoretical frameworks. So those who prefer to talk in terms of
rights violations, for instance, can do so. Similarly, it does not matter if inclusive
environmental ethicists deny that it is a good thing to bring new species, ecosystems, and
so forth into existence.xviii As long as they grant that our actions impact at least existing
individuals and so forth in ways that merit consideration, a revised version of the above
argument will apply.
Finally, none of this commits those who care about many things to embracing a
biocentric ethic on which most or all parts of nature (e.g. individuals or species) merit
equal consideration or respect. So the problem for inclusive environmental ethics is not
just a version of the problem that plagues (egalitarian) biocentric ethics (Taylor 1986;
Davion 2006).xix Inclusive environmental ethicists who are not biocentrists need not be
particularly concerned with “the morality of swatting pesky flies, mowing the lawn, [or]
building patios” (Davion 2006, 126). For, recall that these ethicists need only hold the
following propositions: 1) many parts of nature -- individuals, species, ecosystems and so
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forth -- have some non-instrumental value and 2) concern for some of these things does
not always trump concern for others.
The problem for inclusive environmental ethics just stems from the fact that they
are radically incomplete; although they can provide some reasons in favor of particular
climate change policies, they also provide reasons not to implement those policies. They
do not tell us where the weight of reason lies. Inclusive environmental ethicists do not
have a complete theory that can tell us what to do about climate change.
Objections, Replies, and the Anthropocentric Liberal’s Argument
The rest of this section will consider several possible responses to the above
argument. First, it will consider whether the current episode of climate change, because it
is anthropogenic, is unlike other episodes of climate change in problematic ways. Next, it
will consider arguments that emphasize the harm that climate change will cause many
parts of nature. This section will conclude that none of these responses is successful. So,
anthropocentric liberals may reject inclusive environmental ethics because they cannot
provide definitive reason to accept their preferred climate change policies.
Consider, first, how inclusive environmental ethicists might appeal to one of J.
Baird Callicott’s arguments for addressing other anthropogenic environmental
disturbances. Maybe “the problem with anthropogenic disturbances… is that they are far
more frequent, widespread, and regularly occurring than are non-anthropogenic
disturbances, they are well out of the spatial and temporal range of disturbances
experienced by ecosystems over evolutionary time” (Callicott 2001, 215). Because the
current episode of climate change is anthropogenic, it may be unnatural in a problematic
way (Mathews 2002).
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It is not clear, however, that anthropogenic climate change is likely to occur at
different spatial and temporal scales than non-anthropogenic climate change. In fact, we
know that the climate has changed just as rapidly in the past as it appears to be changing
now and scientists predict similar results (National Environmental Satellite, Data, and
Information Service 2008). So Callicott’s argument does not work in the present case,
even though many other anthropogenic disturbances occur at different spatial and
temporal scales than corresponding non-anthropogenic disturbances.
Even if anthropogenic climate change is different in some respects from past
climatic shifts, that may be good. These differences may benefit some species or
ecosystems, for instance. Nor will it help to grant that natural processes are better than
anthropogenic ones (a difficult proposition to support). Inclusive environmental ethicists
believe many things matter besides processes. So, more argument is necessary to
conclude that it is wrong for us to alter the climate.
Inclusive environmental ethicists might argue that it does not matter what good
our actions do for individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth. Perhaps what matters is
that we do not harm these things. Since the current episode of climate change is
anthropogenic, we are harming some individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth. So,
perhaps, we have reason to stop contributing to climate change and, perhaps, to mitigate
the damage we have caused.
It is at least plausible, however, that we should sometimes promote the interests of
sentient creatures, preserve species, and restore ecosystems or the biosphere. Even some
who do not qualify as animal rights activists argue, for instance, that we should promote
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our pets’ health (Calicott 1988). Others suggest preserving species threatened by nonanthropogenic environmental problems (Jamieson 1997).xx
Further, mitigation will harm some of the things that matter to inclusive
environmental ethicists. If, for instance, people started using solar energy rather than
fossil fuels to mitigate climate change, that would probably harm some ecosystems and
species. For, photovoltaic panels contain some toxic semi-conducting materials (US
Department of Energy 2009).xxi In fact, mitigation will harm some parts of nature on any
plausible baseline for harm.xxii It will make some individuals, species, ecosystems and so
forth worse off than they would have been if we had never emitted any green house
gasses. It will even make some of these things worse off than they would have been if we
had never been on the planet at all. Some birds that fly into the wind-farms would have
survived, but for our having existed, caused climate change, and put up the farms to
mitigate its impact.xxiii
Perhaps inclusive environmental ethicists can defend mitigation (in general), even
with an incomplete ethic. They might give something like the following argument in
favor of mitigation.
1) There will be more harms and more severe harms to things that matter if we
do not mitigate climate change than if we do.
2) On inclusive environmental ethics there is an obligation not to harm
individuals, species, ecosystems, and so forth.
C) So, we should mitigate climate change.
Inclusive environmental ethicists might suggest that they do not need to say any more
because, given their commitments, it is easy to see why mitigation is necessary.
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Even if this argument for mitigation in general goes through, inclusive
environmental ethicists may still have a problem justifying the particular climate change
policies they prefer. For, much more detail may be necessary to arbitrate between these
strategies.
It is not clear, however, that the above argument can even support mitigation in
general. It contains an important ambiguity. It is possible to understand its first premise in
two ways – as implicitly normative or purely descriptive. If it is implicitly normative and
is supposed to entail that the harms climate change will bring are impermissible, it
requires more defense. Why think the number and kind of harms climate change will
bring will be greater in any morally relevant sense than the number and kind of harms
mitigation will bring? If the claim that the number and kind of harms climate change will
bring will be greater than those of mitigation is purely descriptive, however, then it is not
clear why 1) and 2) are supposed to entail 3). To make this argument valid, rather than 2),
inclusive environmental ethics require something like:
3) If there will be more harms and more severe harms to things that matter if we
do not mitigate climate change than if we do, we should mitigate.
But then we return to our original question: Why do the number and severity of the harms
that will occur if we do not mitigate outweigh or trump the other harms (and possibly
benefits) that mitigation will bring? If inclusive environmental ethicists want to engage
with others who do not agree that we must mitigate climate change for this reason, they
must answer this question. They cannot just appeal to 3) -- the brute principle that we
should mitigate the greatest number and most severe harms in this case. Nor can inclusive
environmental ethicists simply assert that any reasonable environmental ethic has to
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provide reason to mitigate climate change (Shue 2008; Hassoun 2009b; Jamieson 1997;
Gardiner 2004).xxiv They need an explanation to engage with others who do not simply
see this truth, not just a desideratum.
Although nothing we have said so far demands that inclusive environmental
ethicists adopt consequentialism, they might do so to support the third premise above.xxv
On some versions of consequentialism, for instance, we should minimize the sum of
harm. These ethicists could then give the above argument in favor of mitigating climate
change.xxvi
We need to know more about the kind of consequentialism at issue to decide
whether it is plausible, however. Do all individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth
count equally? Or, do harms to some things (e.g. humans) count more than harms to other
things (e.g. mosquitoes)? How much more?
Environmental ethicists have done some work that might provide answers to these
questions. Inclusive environmental ethicists might, for instance, appeal to Paul Taylor’s
work on how to weigh and balance the interests of members of different species. For, his
theory is perhaps the most developed (though Taylor does not qualify as a
consequentialist or an inclusive environmental ethicist). He gives a deontological theory
and does not think species, ecosystems, or the biosphere have non-instrumental value.
Taylor suggests a version of species egalitarianism but he argues that, in cases of conflict,
it is acceptable to sacrifice nonhuman interests for basic human interests (Taylor 1981,
264-265). He believes humans can invoke a right to self-defense in such cases as long as
they try to minimize these conflicts. In other cases, he suggests satisfying only non-basic
human interests that are compatible with an attitude of respect for nature in the least
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harmful way. He also believes we should advance the basic interests of all equally and
compensate for undue harms and unjust inequalities in the distribution of resources
(Taylor 1981).
Taylor’s principles are not plausible, however. It is not clear, for instance, that we
should be so egalitarian. As David Schmidtz points out, species egalitarianism seems to
suggest that it often makes no difference what we kill (Schmidtz 2002c, 97). It is not
plausible to think that killing a cow or a turnip carries the same moral weight. Nor is it
clear that we should be just as inclined to do research on a chimpanzee as a mouse.
Even if some inclusive ethicists disagree, however, and want to embrace such
egalitarianism, they must say more. Otherwise, they cannot provide a complete
justification even for mitigating climate change. They must explain how to take the noninstrumental value of species, ecosystems, and the biosphere into account as well as the
interests of individuals.
Unless I am overlooking something in the environmental ethics literature,
inclusive environmental ethicists must do further work to justify the climate change
policies they prefer.xxvii Even to decide whether climate change is generally good or bad,
they need an account of how much each of its effects matters or which considerations
trump all others. Would it be bad if climate change caused massive extinctions but
increased biodiversity, benefitting the biosphere? Would it be good if climate change
saved some species from extinction but harmed many individuals in the process? While
this article will say more about the answers to these questions below, they are difficult
and divisive (Schmidtz 2002a; Schmidtz 2002c; Rolston, 2002; Singer, 1993). There is
no well worked out theory that takes into account all of the things inclusive
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environmental ethicists care about and provides determinate answers to all of these
questions.xxviii So, inclusive environmental ethics are radically incomplete; although they
can provide some reasons in favor of particular climate change policies, they also provide
reasons not to implement those policies. They do not tell us where the weight of reason
lies.
Because inclusive environmental ethics are radically incomplete, even if the
climate change policies their advocates prefer are morally permissible, inclusive
environmental ethics cannot justify these policies right now. Even worse, a different (e.g.
anthropocentric liberal) theory may provide this justification. So, anthropocentric liberals
might conclude that this argument gives us reason to reject inclusive environmental
ethics.
3. Response to the Argument Against Inclusive Environmental Ethics
This section responds to the anthropocentric liberals’ argument. It suggests that,
even if inclusive environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to accept their
favorite climate change policies right now, such ethics might be developed further so that
they can justify climate change policies in the future. Moreover, inclusive environmental
ethics may, right now, provide all the resources we need for an adequate response to
climate change. Finally, this section argues that there is reason to be optimistic about the
prospects for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change.
The anthropocentric liberal’s argument went something like this:
1. There is no compelling inclusive environmental ethic that takes into account
all of the relevant considerations and tells us what to do about climate change.
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2. So even if the climate change policies their advocates prefer are morally
permissible, they cannot be justified by inclusive environmental ethics.
3. Hence, we should reject inclusive environmental ethics.
There are different ways of locating the problem with this argument. Initially, the
move from this argument’s first to second premise might seem most questionable. This
article has only argued that inclusive environmental ethicists cannot provide definitive
reason to accept their preferred climate change policies right now. Interpreting the second
premise in this way, however, the argument’s biggest problem is in the move from this
premise to its conclusion. For, it is possible that their ethics can be developed enough to
provide all the resources we need for an adequate response to climate change. Some such
ethics even be developed enough right now that they allow us to make all of the
necessary choices on the ground when we need to make them. Suppose, for instance, that
climate change would expand the range of a species in the Sonoran desert that would
otherwise hover on the verge of extinction. An inclusive environmental ethic may give us
reason to mitigate climate change and protect that species in another way. We might, for
instance, be able to protect the species by expanding the Sonoran National Park. Of
course, creating a nature reserve will require (scarce) resources, but it is far from clear
that we cannot both mitigate climate change and create the necessary reserves etc. There
may be policies that can mitigate any important conflicts between the things that matter
to inclusive environmental ethicists.
Anthropocentric liberals might argue, however, that we should reject inclusive
environmental ethics because no climate change policy will be morally permissible on
any such ethic. This article started by assuming that there will be winners and losers from
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climate change policies. If this assumption is reasonable, anthropocentric liberals might
argue, so is the assumption that no climate change policy will be morally permissible on
any inclusive environmental ethic. On inclusive environmental ethics (almost) everything
matters. Climate change is a global problem likely to impact almost all of these things.
There are limited resources for dealing with environmental problems. Though we might
be able to protect the climate and wetlands, we cannot protect the climate and everything
else that matters to inclusive environmental ethicists.
The scope of climate change and inclusive environmental ethicists’ concern
certainly makes it seem likely that no climate change policy will be morally permissible
on any inclusive environmental ethic. But, just as global problems present many
challenges, the global scope of possible policy responses to these problems present many
ways of addressing these challenges. In a small community, for instance, it may turn out
that it is only possible to protect the environment or jobs (e.g. logging may be the only
viable industry in the area). If the loggers can get different jobs in the city, however, that
might be morally permissible on an inclusive environmental ethic.xxix The claim that no
climate change policy will be morally permissible on any inclusive environmental ethic is
unwarrantedly strong. Though we might not be able to protect the climate and everything
else that matters, there may be some morally permissible policies on some inclusive
environmental ethics.
Besides, the fact that a theory is incomplete and cannot provide definitive reason
to accept any climate change policies right now is not a reason to reject it. For many
theories are incomplete without being valueless. Incomplete theories may provide insight.
They may even provide important guidance. Inclusive environmental ethics tell us a lot
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about the nature of environmental value and provide reasons (though, perhaps, not
definitive reasons) in favor of many policies. Theoretical incompleteness may just be a
reason to reject a theory’s application, rather than the theory itself.xxx
Finally, inclusive environmental ethicists might even go further to argue that we
should be optimistic about the prospects for some inclusive environmental ethics to
address climate change. Without a complete theory, it is not clear how inclusive
environmental ethicists can provide a deductive argument for this conclusion. They
might, however, challenge a common presumption that may undergird the
anthropocentric liberal’s skepticism. Inclusive environmental ethicists might challenge
the presumption that it is often impossible to protect all of the things that matter to them.
In doing so, they can also illustrate a general strategy for addressing climate change –
implementing their preferred policies and addressing potential problems as they arise.
Many environmental ethicists (amongst others) presume that it is often impossible
to protect all of the things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists (Rolston 2002;
Sagoff 1984; Callicott 1980). Some presume, for instance, that we must choose between
protecting people and other parts of nature. Others argue that we must sometimes choose
whether to protect individuals or species and ecosystems (Schmidtz 2002a; Schmidtz
2002b). If this article can provide reasons to doubt these authors’ examples,
anthropocentric liberals should think twice before they assert that there will be
insurmountable difficulties in dealing with climate change.
Consider, first, how it is possible to respond to the claim that there is no way to
protect people’s basic interests (including their interest in freedom) and other parts of
nature (Rolston 2002). David Schmidtz makes the case that the interests of people and
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nature align much more closely than many have thought. He does this by considering the
purported conflict between preservationist and conservationist theories (Schmidtz 2002a;
Schmidtz 2002b). Preservationists often argue for “no use” policies because they believe
we should preserve nature (protecting it even if doing so is not in human interests).
Conservationists often argue for “wise use” policies that conserve nature (protecting it
whenever doing so is in human’s interests). Schmidtz suggests that we must sometimes
preserve nature to conserve it. In some circumstances, wise use may be no use at all. It
may not be wise to even consider using nature if there is some risk that doing so will
expose us to unknown dangers. But, Schmidtz suggests, to really protect nature, we
sometimes have to use it wisely. Hunting may, for instance, be a good way of protecting
elephants. Hunters will pay to maintain nature reserves that would otherwise be turned
into towns (Schmidtz 2002a; Schmidtz 2002b).xxxi
Schmidtz suggests that the real tension is not between saving people and nature
but between saving non-human individuals and protecting species and ecosystems. He
recalls the debate between animal rights activists and forest rangers concerned about
species preservation and the Yellowstone ecosystem. When a herd of sheep in
Yellowstone got pink-eye, the rangers did not save the sheep. They let nature take its
course. Animal rights activists were incensed especially since, a few years before, the
rangers had gone to heroic lengths to save a grizzly and her cub trapped on a quickly
melting island of ice. The rangers argued, however, that it was important to save the
grizzly and let the sheep die to preserve the health of the species and the Yellowstone
ecosystem. Similarly, Schmidtz argues, only animal rights activists should object to
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hunting in national parks when hunting is the best way to preserve wildlife (Schmidtz
2002a; Schmidtz 2002b).
But, even the tension between animal rights activists and others who care about
nature may be overstated (Callicott 1980; Sagoff 1984; Callicott 1988). Perhaps animal
rights activists could have convinced the rangers to let them transport the sheep to
another reserve capable of supporting them (perhaps Yosemite was low on sheep). And,
if the rangers’ objection was to letting the sheep reproduce in the wild at all (perhaps their
main concern was about the natural evolution of the species) the sheep might be sterilized
first or kept as pets. Similarly, eco-tourism rather than hunting in Africa might preserve
both individual animals and other parts of the natural world. And some argue that even
animal rights activists should sometimes support killing or letting individuals die (Varner
1995).
The cases above illustrate how we might sometimes protect all of the things that
matter on some inclusive environmental ethics even though it is common to assume that
we cannot. They provide some (admittedly tentative) reasons for optimism. For, they
illustrate how there are overlooked alternatives to many purportedly irresolvable conflicts
between protecting things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists. The above
cases demonstrate how some such ethics can resolve a range of environmental
problems.xxxii They illustrate a general strategy addressing climate change – dealing with
potential problems for climate change policies as they arise – what conservation
biologists call adaptive management. To pursue adaptive management policy makers
tentatively implement a policy, test its impact on different variables of interest, and then
repeat the process until they find an acceptable policy.xxxiii Perhaps inclusive
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environmental ethicists can use this strategy to address climate change. They might look
at how the policies they implement affect everything they care about and try to adjust
them in light of the evidence. There is reason for optimism.
Some inclusive environmental ethicists cannot produce permissible climate
change policies. An inclusive environmental ethicist who holds, for instance, that we can
never harm individuals may not be able to license any climate change policies. Almost
any climate change policy we implement will harm some individuals (recall the bird and
the windmill). Nevertheless, some inclusive environmental ethics can probably license
some climate change policies.
Perhaps the above argument presupposes that inclusive environmental ethicists
have a theory that can justify climate change policy. After all, if it is possible to say that
some policies are acceptable, they must have a principle explaining why that is so. The
set of principles licensing an acceptable policy is just what inclusive environmental
ethicists were supposed to be missing.
For the above argument to work, it must be the case that some plausible inclusive
environmental ethics could endorse the policies suggested above. But, that is not the
same as presupposing a complete inclusive environmental ethic. Rather, the above
arguments suggest that such an ethic might, plausibly, support these policies. (There may
be many plausible ethics that would support these policies.)xxxiv
Perhaps one could argue that this section provides, rather than presupposes, the
complete inclusive ethic the previous section claimed was missing. Maybe we should
pursue adaptive management. Perhaps we should implement the policies that seem most
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reasonable in light of existing evidence and theories and then address any problems that
arise for things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists (Lee 1999).
Although I would be happy if this were so, it is not clear that this section has
completely dissipated the problem for inclusive environmental ethics. Nor, without a
much more developed theory, is it clear that these ethics can provide definitive reason to
attempt adaptive management. Adaptive management seems utterly reasonable in the
present case, but some of the things that matter on inclusive environmental ethics might
do better if we took a different approach (Lee 1999). The arguments above just provide
reason to be optimistic about the prospects for such ethics to adequately address climate
change. Inclusive environmental ethicists may be able to advocate adaptive management
but there may be other ways of addressing climate change they could reasonably support
as well.xxxv
To recap, this section suggested that the anthropocentric liberals’ argument for
rejecting inclusive environmental ethics traded on an ambiguity. Although inclusive
environmental ethicists cannot offer definitive reason to accept their preferred climate
change policies, their theories might be developed further in order to provide this
justification. To reject such ethics anthropocentric liberals must deny the follow claim: If
1) there is no reason to think the theory can never justify good climate change policies, 2)
it may be acceptable even if it is incomplete and cannot provide these policies right now.
Furthermore, this section suggested that we should be especially hesitant to reject
incomplete theories when 3) they provide some important guidance or 4) we have reason
to be optimistic about their prospects for providing all of the guidance we need. This
section argued that inclusive environmental ethics may be able to provide justification for
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good policy responses to climate change. It also argued that they may provide some
guidance right now and we have reason to be optimistic about their prospects for
providing all of the guidance we need. So, inclusive environmental ethicists might
maintain their theories, even though they are incomplete and cannot tell us what to do
about climate change right now.
This article’s lessons might generalize beyond inclusive environmental ethics.
Any incomplete pluralistic theory, on which more than one thing matters, may face a
problem similar to the problem that afflicts inclusive environmental ethics. Unless a
theory is comprehensive -- explaining how all of the things that matter should be taken
into account -- it may not provide definitive reason to accept any climate change
policies.xxxvi Even some anthropocentric liberal theories may have this problem. The
climate change policy that best promotes some human freedoms may undermine others.
Depending on how emissions permits are allocated, this response to climate change may
make it more difficult for some to secure important positive freedoms or basic
capabilities.xxxvii Liberal theories concerned about both the freedom to trade and basic
capabilities must tell us how we should take these freedoms into account when it is
difficult to protect both. Otherwise, they cannot provide a definitive evaluation of policies
like these.
Inclusive environmental ethics are, however, more likely to suffer from the kind
of problem this article has sketched than anthropocentric liberal ones. For, some
anthropocentric liberal theories only embrace a concern for one kind of human freedom.
Inclusive environmental ethics are, by definition, concerned about more than one
thing.xxxviii
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Furthermore, even though inclusive environmental ethics are not the only ethics
that have the problem this paper has sketched, that they have it is both surprising and
significant. For, until now, environmental ethicists have been the ones worrying that their
competitors cannot adequately address climate change, rather than the other way around.
Moreover, in virtue of their comprehensiveness, one might have expected inclusive
environmental ethics to be best for dealing with climate change. But it is precisely
because these ethics are comprehensive that they have this problem.
Finally, though the kind of problem this article has set out for inclusive
environmental ethicists is general, at least the core of its response to the anthropocentric
liberal’s argument is general as well. It is not clear that we should reject a theory just
because it cannot right now provide definitive reason to accept any climate change
policies. Rather, such theories might be developed further so that they can justify some
climate change policies. Moreover, such theories might be able to tell us how to make all
of the decisions that we must actually make on the ground. So, if there are good reasons
to believe what these theories do say, creativity rather than despair may be on order.xxxix
4. Conclusion
Many versions of liberalism give us definitive reason to mitigate climate change.
Environmental ethicists argue, however, that at least anthropocentric versions of
liberalism do not account for many things that matter. These critics suggest that
individuals of other species, species, ecosystems and so forth have a kind of value beyond
what they contribute to protecting human freedom. Further, on inclusive environmental
ethics, concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others.
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This article has argued that, although there is probably something to inclusive
environmental ethics, they have a different problem. When there are many things of
value, figuring out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is
likely to harm many species and ecosystems, for instance, it will probably benefit some.
Inclusive environmental ethicists lack a compelling theory taking all these different
considerations into account. Without this theory they cannot provide definitive reason to
accept their preferred climate change policies. So, anthropocentric liberals might
conclude, that we should not accept such ethics.
This article does not provide a solution to the inclusive environmental ethicists’
problem – they lack a complete and plausible theory that can provide definitive reason to
accept any climate change policies right now. It does, however, suggest that
anthropocentric liberals cannot use this conclusion to conclude that we should reject
inclusive environmental ethics. Inclusive environmental ethics might be developed to
justify the climate change policies their proponents prefer. Further, their theories may
provide all the resources we need for an adequate response to climate change right now.
To support this last line of thought, this article considered how inclusive
environmental ethicists might go further to argue that we should be optimistic about the
prospects for some inclusive environmental ethics to address climate change. The
environmental ethics literature is replete with purported dilemmas for such ethics. Some
argue, for instance, that we must either save people or nature (Rolston 2002). Others
suggest that we must choose between saving individuals and saving species or
ecosystems (Schmidtz 2002b). This section argued, however, that we should not assume
that such conflicts are irresolvable. When we lack a complete theory, it may be best to try

26

to come up with creative responses to environmental problems compatible with the moral
knowledge we do have. We may, for instance, find good policies that can protect all of
the things that matter to inclusive environmental ethicists. Suppose the best alternative
energy source harms some valuable ecosystems -- say, wetlands. A good climate change
policy might rely upon that energy source, while at the same time advancing wetland
conservation programs. It will probably be hard for inclusive environmental ethicists to
decide what to do about climate change, but we should not assume that inclusive
environmental ethics cannot justify doing anything.
I am not entirely sure the problem this article raises for inclusive environmental
ethics is genuine. Nor am I sure that the suggested response to the anthropocentric
liberal’s claim that this problem gives us reason to reject inclusive environmental ethics
is a good one. Nevertheless, I hope that this article’s arguments merit response and
further exploration. Moreover, whether or not these arguments work in the present case,
they may be of interest even to those who reject inclusive environmental ethics. For many
theories endorse more than one kind of value and lack principles for resolving all of the
conflicts that may arise between these values. Even some anthropocentric liberal theories
may have this problem.
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ii One might, of course, deny that anything has non-instrumental value, but this article will not address this kind

of skepticism.

iii Non-anthropocentric environmental ethicists believe that humans are not the only things that matter. See

(Schmidtz 2002d) for discussion.

iv For criticism of liberal ethics see (Gardiner 2009a; Gardiner 2009b; Hayward, 2009). Gardiner gives a

sophisticated critique of John Rawls’ theory in particular and political theories more generally. In his general

criticism of liberalism he raises this problem, although the thrust of his critique is somewhat different.

v By endorsing the claim that some things have non-instrumental value, environmental ethicists need not be

committing themselves to any meta-ethical views. For discussion see: (Schmidtz and Willott, 2002).

vi Richard Routley’s last man argument is perhaps the most famous argument in support of this conclusion

(Schmidtz & Willott, 2002).

vii There are also many ways of resolving the inclusive environmental ethicists’ problem. This article will

suggest, however, that inclusive environmental ethicists lack the theory that will allow them to resolve it. See

(Gardiner 2009a) for critique of high-level solutions to the climate change problem.

viii His ethic would, presumably, require radical action to address climate change.
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ix Certainly, many agree that individuals, species, ecosystems and so forth have non-instrumental value

(Jamieson 1997; Gardiner 2004; Moriarty, 2006; Hassoun and Wong forthcoming). Though it is not always clear

whether these environmental ethicists think concern for one of these things always trumps concern for others. I

am pretty sure, for instance, that Gardiner thinks many things have non-instrumental value but it is not clear

whether they think concern for one of these things always trumps concern for others. Carafo is obviously

concerned about individuals and ecosystems and it is pretty clear that he does not think concern for human

interests always trumps concern for other parts of nature. Some deep ecologists probably also endorse an

inclusive environmental ethic (though those who commit to the Gaia hypothesis, for instance, may be better

classified as biocentrists) (Naess 2005). Even if, however, no one was an inclusive environmental ethicist this

article may be of interest. For, it at least illustrates some challenges for those who might be inclined to adopt the

position.

x This section draws heavily on (Hassoun 2009a).

xi This article talks about how humans, collectively, affect the natural world and about what climate change

policy humanity should embrace mainly to avoid worries about the non-identity problem and worries about

responsibility for very small (e.g. individual) contributions to climate change. Note, however, that even the green

house gasses individuals emit will probably impact some existing individuals, species, and ecosystems. For, it

takes only a few years for CO2 emissions to affect the surface temperature of the ocean, for instance (Adams,

2009).
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xii Of course, environmental ethicists might also decide not to mitigate climate change but to help those

negatively impacted by it in another way.

xiii As noted above, it may be impossible to harm or benefit future individuals and so forth but nothing here

relies on that being possible. One need not even care if climate change brings about good and bad states of affairs

for future individuals etc. For, climate change will harm and benefit some presently existing individuals etc.

xiv (Joyce & Keigwin, 2003).

xv Again, to generate the problem we need not suppose that we can harm or benefit future individuals and so

forth. So, this article’s argument need not contend with the non-identity problem.

xvi Similarly, (Sterba 1995) argues that species may benefit from the death of their weaker members.

xvii Allowing climate change to continue unabated is, after all, one such policy.

xviii Those who are only concerned about nature’s interests or about rights violations might, for instance, argue

that the non-identity problem gives one reason to reject this claim. For, we cannot benefit or harm these things by

bringing them into existence or failing to do so. Nor do future species, ecosystems, and so forth have rights that

can be violated in this way. (Rights-theorists might say, however, that we violate rights of currently non-existent

individuals and so forth when we bring them into being very poorly off -- even when only alternative was to

cause other beings to come into existence).

xix Taylor advances a series of priority principles but other biocentrists offer fewer or none at all. See, for

instance: (Schweitzer 1923; Sterba 1995; Taylor 1986).
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xx It might even be good, in some circumstances, to bring new species, ecosystems and so forth into existence.

Consider the choice between pushing two buttons. If you push the first button you will bring into existence a

lifeless planet. If you push the second, you will bring into existence a living planet with many individuals and

ecosystems. Most people would probably push the second button. Or consider a more realistic example. If a

degraded ecosystem cannot be restored, it might sometimes be good, to bring into existence some other

ecosystem in the area.

xxi Attempts to address climate change may bring greater harm to things that matter and, so, be unacceptable.

Even if mitigation is required, different mitigation strategies will impact different parts of nature in different

ways and, so, it is not clear which mitigation strategy is best.

xxii For discussion of different accounts of harm see: (Feinberg, 1984; Frankfurt, 1988; Hassoun, 2009c).

xxiii Presumably, some birds that fly into windmills would have existed even if we had not caused climate

change. If one objects to this example, however, it is possible to provide another.

xxiv For one of the most extensive ethics that attempts to address the problem of climate change see (Attfield

1999). Attfield does not, however, believe that ecosystems and species have non-instrumental value.

xxv I set aside here general worries about whether or not traditional versions of consequentialism can guide

action.

xxvi For discussion of consequentialism in environmental ethics and its incompleteness see: (Jamieson, 2003).
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xxvii Inclusive environmental ethicists are not the only one’s that have this kind of problem. Many theories are

incomplete and cannot tell us what to do about important challenges like climate change. Even some liberal

theories that endorse more than one kind of freedom may face this sort of problem. Because they believe almost

everything matters, however, the problem of incompleteness is particularly pressing for inclusive environmental

ethicists.

xxviii Of course, there are similarly difficult and divisive empirical questions about how climate change will

affect individuals, species, ecosystems, and the biosphere (IPCC, 2007 2007, 20). This article will focus

primarily on figuring out what to do in the face of massive normative (as opposed to empirical) uncertainties.

Some of the conclusions it will arrive at may, however, help in dealing with empirical uncertainties.

xxix I owe thanks to Jason Matteson for this point and to Ron Sandler for encouraging me to take very seriously

the harms climate change may bring.

xxx Note that an inclusive environmental ethic might even fail to fulfill its author’s desiderata for a good theory

without being valueless.

xxxi Many of Schmidtz’s examples show how it is possible to protect nature even without modifying property

rights.

xxxii Of course, this article started from the observation that resolving these tensions requires some moral

knowledge but, as the cases above illustrate, we often have the relevant knowledge. If all the things inclusive
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environmental ethicists care about matter then we know, for instance, that there is reason to protect both

individuals and ecosystems in Yellowstone.

xxxiii There are many methods for doing this. For discussion of some see: (Sit & Taylor, 1998). Adaptive

management strategies might include some experimental and non-experimental research as well.

xxxiv Perhaps this section’s arguments would be buttressed by a general commitment to some sort of

particularism on which we can have moral knowledge on the ground without a complete theory.

xxxv They might, for instance, succeed in deriving climate change policy from a complete and plausible theory

by focusing right now on doing more environmental ethics.

xxxvi This may apply to other large scale problems as well.

xxxvii This might be so if the initial permits are auctioned off to those with the greatest ability to pay. For, then,

the poorest will have to buy the permits they need for sustenance emissions.

xxxviii Perhaps because they have been around longer, many anthropocentric theories are also much more

developed (consider, for instance, John Rawls’ theory of justice). They have to be extended, however, to account

for environmental values. On this also see: (Gardiner, 2009a; Gardiner, 2009b).

xxxix In the present case, we have seen how inclusive environmental ethicists might suggest that there are some

reasons for optimism.
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